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Forget the Truth

By Peter Eisner and Knut Royce

The Bush White House was never really preoccupied with the question of whether or not Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.  It wasn’t until “late 2002,” virtually on the eve of the U.S. invasion, that the administration ordered the CIA to shift priority on WMD intelligence collection to Iraq from North Korea and Iran, according to an internal CIA report.

The administration’s belated concern appears to have been driven by two contemporary events.  The White House at the time was narrowly focused on rallying public support for war by invoking the specter of mushroom clouds, and any supportive “intelligence” would be useful.  That would also serve as backup ammunition to discredit inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, reintroduced into Iraq after a four-year hiatus, if they were to conclude there was nothing there.

The decision to invade had been made months earlier.  There would be no show-stoppers.  No matter that the belated emphasis on discovering Iraq’s alleged banned weapons produced nothing, or that the IAEA also came up with blanks.